Bias in perceptual decisions comes to pass when the advance knowledge colluded with the current sensory evidence in support of the final choice. The literature on decision making suggests two main hypotheses to account for this kind of bias: internal bias signals are derived from (a) the residual of motor response-related signals, and (b) the sensory information residues of the decisions that we made in the past. Beside these hypotheses, a credible hypothesis proposed by this study to explain the cause of decision biasing, suggests that the decision maker neuron can make use of the residual information of the previous decisions for the current decision. We demonstrate the validity of this assumption, first by performing behavioral experiments based on the two alternative forced-choice discrimination of motion direction paradigms. Secondly, by making use of the fitted models based on accumulation to the bound mechanism. In both cases, previous trial's trace can be seen on the current decision. Results indicated the probability of being correct in current decision increases if the previous decision is towards the current decision. Also, the model keeps the previous decision information, provides a better fit to the behavioral data. Our findings suggest that the state of decision variable which is represented in the activity of decision maker neurons after crossing the bound (in the previous decision) can accumulate with the decision variable for the current decision in consecutive trials.
A B S T R A C T
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Perceptual decisions and their outcomes can be related to each other as a sequence (Akaishi, Umeda, Nagase, & Sakai, 2014; Mulder, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Boekel, & Forstmann, 2012) . This ability to merge the advance knowledge about choice alternatives with current evidence to make an appropriate decision is a hallmark of higher brain function (Churchland, Kiani, & Shadlen, 2008; Cook & Maunsell, 2002; Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Heitz & Schall, 2012; Kiani, Hanks, & Shadlen, 2008; Ratcliff, Hasegawa, Hasegawa, Smith, & Segraves, 2007; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002) . Neural activities in brain areas involved in decision making process, seems to contain the history of previous decisions for a specific period and do not return to the initial baseline at the time of decision making (Akaishi et al., 2014; Basten, Biele, Heekeren, & Fiebach, 2010; Boettiger et al., 2007; Fleming, Thomas, & Dolan, 2010; Fleming, Whiteley, Hulme, Sahani, & Dolan, 2010; Forstmann, Brown, Dutilh, Neumann, & Wagenmakers, 2010; Mulder et al., 2012; Philiastides, Biele, & Heekeren, 2010; Preuschhof, Schubert, Villringer, & Heekeren, 2010; Scheibe, Ullsperger, Sommer, & Heekeren, 2010; Serences, 2008; Summerfield & Koechlin, 2008 , 2010 . Recent findings suggest that there is a preference in humans especially in an ambiguous stimulus to make the same decision as their previous one (Akaishi et al., 2014; Brehm, 1956; Izuma & Murayama, 2013) . This interaction between the history of choices and sensory context, called internal and external signals respectively is thought to cause the biased decisions about the sensory events (Akaishi et al., 2014; Albright, 2012; Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012; Carnevale, de Lafuente, Romo, & Parga, 2012) .
The mechanism of decision bias as most important of cognitive biases, however, remains obscure (Glimcher, 2003; Lauwereyns, 2010; Summerfield & Koechlin, 2010) . Two main hypotheses have been proposed to explain the reasons of this bias, although to date none of these have been adequately supported (Akaishi et al., 2014) . According to the first view, the residual of the sensory information of the previous stimulus is caused the internal bias signals (Akaishi et al., 2014) . Therefore, a strong sensory signal in the previous trial raises the neural response in the sensory area and current decision is expected to be made under a larger bias. The alternative view is that the residual of motor responserelated signals is caused the internal bias signals that contrary to the first impression, the strength of the sensory signal in the previous trial doesn't seem to affect the decision-biasing (Akaishi et al., 2014) .
Akaishi et al., also suggest that in the absence of feedback this bias is a mechanism to update the likelihood of a choice to be made.
Over and above the mentioned assumptions, the following hypothesis is proposed in this study as plausible: The residual information of the previous decision in the decision maker neuron can be informative for current decision. We tested the validity of this claim using behavioral experiments based on the two forced-choice discrimination of motion direction and modeling approach. We will reveal that firstly, the probability of being correct in current decision increases if the previous decision is towards the current decision, showing a trace from the previous trial on the current one. Secondly, this effect is independent of the correctness of the previous decision and the feedback which subjects receive. Thirdly, taking the strong stimuli off the analysis amplifies the observed effect which we refer it as repulsive adaptation effect in these stimuli (Kohn, 2007) . These last two, ruling out the effect of the previous stimuli and consist on the decision per se.
Finally, in order to shed a light on the plausible mechanism of the observed effect, we used one successful and the elaborate variant of decision making models based on the accumulation-to-bound mechanism which is called the "drift-diffusion" (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Voss, Nagler, & Lerche, 2013; Voss, Rothermund, & Voss, 2004; Voss & Voss, 2007) . The activity of accumulating information starts from a baseline point toward a criterion level or bound where the decision process is terminated (Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 2006; Ratcliff, 1978 Ratcliff, , 2002 . It seems as though, the starting point of evidence accumulation varies depending on the different parameters show that the model keeps previous decision information, provides a better fit to the behavioral data which led us to propose that, the state of decision variable (Gold & Shadlen, 2007) after crossing the bound (in the previous decision) can accumulate with decision variable for current decision in consecutive trials.
M E T H O D S
SUBJECTS. In this experiment, six adult subjects, three male and three female, with normal or correct-to-normal vision were tested. All subjects, except for two of the authors, were unfamiliar to the design of the experiment. They signed informed written consent before attending in this study. All experimental protocols were approved by the Iran University of Medical Sciences. After that, the motion stimuli was shown for 120 ms, 400 ms or 720 ms. The Go signal followed by a 120 ms delay period cued subjects to report their decision, within 1 second, by pressing two specific keys. Auditory feedback was played for 100 ms. The next trial was started after a gap ranged from 0 to 1.2s (See Methods).
BEHAVIORAL TASK. All experiments were done in a semi-dark and sound-proof room. Subjects were seated in an adjustable chair at the distance of 57 cm from a CRT display monitor (19 inch, screen resolution, 800×600, refresh rate, 75 Hz). An adjustable chin-rest was appropriated to support the subject's chin and forehead. Each trial started with a red fixation point (FP, 0.3° diameter) at the center of the screen and two red choice targets (0.5° diameter) on the right and left side of the fixation point (10° eccentricity). Subjects were asked to fix and maintain their gaze on the fixation point throughout the trial. After a 200 ms delay period, the random dots stimulus was displayed within a 5° circular aperture at the center of the screen for 120, 400, or 720 ms. The percentage of coherently moving dots was randomly chosen from these following values: 0%, 3.2%, 6.4%, 12.8%, 25.6%, and 51.2%. Each pair of consecutive odd (which contains four motion strength values: 0%, 3.2%, 12.8%, and 51.2%) and even (which contains three motion strength values: 3.2%, 6.4%, and 12.8%) trials were separated by a gap (0, 120, or 1200 ms). At the end of stimulus presentation, a 120 ms delay period was occurred.
After the delay period, the Go signal -by disappearing of the fixation point cued subjects to respond.
The subjects were asked to report their decision, about the direction of motion, within 1 s after the Go signal by pressing a left or right key. Distinctive auditory feedback was delivered for 100 ms for correct responses, error responses and missed trials. On trials with 0% coherence, the type of feedback was chosen randomly.
All possible trial types were randomly interleaved in blocks with 150 trials long. Subjects were instructed to perform as accurate as possible. Their overall probability of being correct was shown on the screen at the end of each block and was compared with the instructed target: 80% probability of being correct, a level of accuracy extremely difficult to achieve for the brief and mainly weak stimuli used in this experiment. Each subject performed one or two sessions (each session had four blocks) per day until 3600 trials were collected. The results were consistent across subjects.
VISUAL STIMULI. Stimuli were the known dynamic random dot motion used in a verity of perceptual decision making studies. These stimuli are movies in which some dots are randomly moving in different direction. In each frame, on a black background white dots (2×2 pixel, 0.088° per side) with a density of 16.7 dots/degree2/sec were displayed (Roitman & Shadlen, 2002; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001 ). The stimulus contained three interleaved sets of dots displayed on consecutive video frames. Each set was relocated, three frames (40 ms) later while a fraction of dots had a coherent continuous motion toward a direction and the rest of dots were resettled randomly. The stimulus strength was specified by the fraction of dots which moved coherently. DATA ANALYSIS. Logistic regression models were used to evaluate the impact of different parameters on subjects' decisions. Logit [P] stand for log (p/1-p).
Following regression was used for the role of stimulus strength in the probability of a correct choice.
C is the coherence level.
To evaluate the effect of the previous trial on the probability of being correct in the next trial, two separated regression models were extended. The first one was used to test the impact of the previous decision on the correctness of the next decision in two consecutive trials. Following regression was fitted for this goal:
Where C2 is the coherence level of the even trials. I is an indicator variable for two successive decisions. The null hypothesis is that the previous decision has no significant effect on the performance of the next trial (H0: β1=0).
An extended version of Equation 2 was used to evaluate whether the difference between the performances of the next trial for the correct and wrong odd trials (or for two separated groups of stimulus strength (low and high) of the odd trials) was larger for the Same decision compared with the Different decisions.
Where C2 is the coherence level of the even trials. I and A are indicator variables for two successive decisions and correctness (or group of stimulus strength) of the odd trials, respectively. The null hypothesis is that the differences in performance of the next trial for correct and wrong odd trials (low and high odd trials) are equal for both Same and Different decisions (H0: β3=0).
The second regression was used to evaluate the impact of the stimulus strength in the previous trial on the performance in the next trial. The fitted regression is as following:
Where C1 and C2 are the coherence levels of the odd and even trials, respectively. The null hypothesis is that performance does not depend on the coherence levels of the odd (previous) trials (H0: β1=0).
MODELING.
In order to investigate the mechanism of last decision influence on the current decision,
we used drift diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008) , implemented by Voss et al., in an operative, pliable and user-friendly program called fast-dm (Voss & Voss, 2007) . The PDE method which is suggested by Voss and Voss (Voss & Voss, 2007) through fast computations to calculate the cumulative distribution function (CDF) and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (Voss et al., 2004) to estimate the parameters are applied in fast-dm.
The diffusion model is undoubtedly a well-established model in the perceptual decision literature (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008) . This model is well consistent in both neural and behavioral responses and its different parameters can explain the process of commitment to a choice in the brain.
In simple diffusion model, momentary sensory evidence in favor of one of the choices starts to accumulate from a baseline point z. Just after the integrated evidence (determined by drift rate v) hits a criterion level or bound (a), the decision process is terminated. Seven parameters that exist in the full drift-diffusion model (DDM) are divided into three categories: (1) the decision process parameters (decision bound a, mean baseline point z and mean drift rate v), (2) non-decision process parameter (non-decision time Ter), (3) the variability across-trial parameters (variability in stimulus quality , variability in baseline point sz, and variability in non-decision time st) (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 2002) . According to the proposed hypothesis in the present research, previous decision can influence the current decision process in two possible ways: (a) the previous decision affects the rate of accumulated evidence (i.e., the drift rate, ν) or (b) it changes the mean baseline point of evidence accumulation (z). The diffusion model will be used to disentangle these two scenarios.
R E S U L T S
Six human subjects reported the perceived direction of motion in trials with a 120, 400 or 720 ms duration, their psychometric function is shown in Fig. 2 . Psychometric function of even trials separated in three conditions were plotted in figure 3 . First condition or so called Same decision condition, blue data points, shows performance of even trials which participants have taken a decision similar with the previous odd trial. In the second condition or Different decision condition, red data points, participants' decisions in even trials are different with their previous odd trials. The third condition, black data points, is the performance of all even trials independent of the decision in previous trials. Considering the black data points as a reference, an upward and a downward shift is obvious in the psychometric function of Same and Different decision condition respectively. The shifts are consistent in all three motion strengths of stimuli used in even trials. Red and blue data points depict performance of subjects for "Different" and "Same" conditions, respectively. Black data points are pooled from these two conditions. Each data point presents the performance of pooled data for all three duration and two directions. Error bars indicate SEM. This difference between psychometric functions of the Same and the Different implies that the probability of being correct in a decision not only depend on the stimulus strength but also on the previous decision (Eq. 2, β1=0.25±0. 09, p=5.8×10 -8 ). If the stimulus in an even trial has Same (Different) direction with the chosen direction in the previous trial the probability of being correct in that even trial will increase (decrease).
Since previous decision is itself correlated to previous stimulus, one may conclude that this difference in performance is the effect of stimulus adaptation. Interestingly, the reported effect of previous decision seems to be in contrast with repulsive effect of adaptation. Taking repulsive effect in to account we expect a higher sensitivity for perception of leftward (rightward) motion when it comes after a rightward (leftward) motion. As a result, probability of being correct in Different condition should be higher than in Same condition. In following we tried to shed more light on these two probable contradictory effects with further analysis.
It is worth nothing that if there is any adaptation effect in our paradigm it should be stronger when adaptor -here, the stimulus of previous trial -has high motion coherency. We separated high and low coherency stimuli from the above analysis and calculated how Same and Different conditions differ in performance. Figure 4 illustrates the performance in even trials which includes motion strengths of 3.2%, 6.4% and 12.8%, when previous odd trials are low motion strengths of 0% and 3.2% (left panel, Eq. 2, β1=0.65±0.13, ) and high motion strengths of 12.8% and 51.2% (right panel, Eq. 2, p=0.03) . As shown in this figure subjects are significantly more probable to choose a correct decision in condition Different, when the coherency of previous trial is high which is consistent with repulsive adaptation effect. On the other hand left panel of figure 4 again shows that correct decision is more probable in condition Same when stimulus coherency in previous trial is low (Eq. 3, β3=0.28±0.09, ). The observed effect is significant even when previous odd trails are 0%
coherency. In this coherency all dots move randomly and this will minimize the adaptation in any specific direction. However as illustrated in figure 5 the probability of being correct is more in Same condition than in the Different condition even when there is lack of evidence in previous stimulus (Eq. 2, β1=0.98±0.19, ). As shown in figure 4 , decreasing the effect of stimulus adaptation by excluding even trials which followed by high coherency stimulus, seems to strengthen the effect of previous decision presented in figure 3 . Although results show that probability of being correct in current decision is likely depend on previous decision, there is another confounding factor which avoid us to make a conclusion about the source of this effect. As stated before, feedback signal is different in wrong and correct trials and this signal may result the observed effect. Here in figure 6 , separating the wrong and correct odd trials in both Same and Different conditions, we try to rule out the effect of feedback. As illustrated in this figure the correctness of previous decision in odd trials does not remove the effect explained above.
As shown in figure 6 Same decision trials are significantly more probable to be correct than Different . The performance of even trials which includes motion strengths of 3.2%, 6.4%, and 12.8%. The left panel is the performance of the even trials when their previous odd trials are correct with low motion strengths (0% and 3.2%). The right panel is the performance of the even trials when their previous odd trials are wrong with low motion strengths (0% and 3.2%). Figure shows the accuracy of even trials in Same conditions is higher than Different conditions for both correct and wrong odd trials. Error bars indicate SEM. *** p<1E-3 MODEL FITTING. In order to investigate the underlying mechanism of the previous decision's influence on the probability of being correct in the current decision, we used the diffusion model.
Making the model parameters dependent on the previous decision, gave us an opportunity to compare the effect of the previous decision on each of the parameters. To do so, we ran two modified versions of the diffusion model and compared them with Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) method. The first one (eq.1) is a diffusion model which its starting point of accumulation is dependent on the previous decision and in the second model (eq.2) the drift rate is dependent on the previous decision.
Fitted parameters of both models are shown in table 1 and 2. s and d indices in these tables stand for Same and Different conditions. As for the first table, letting the drift rate to be dependent on the previous decision, there are 6 different drift rates for three coherencies (3.2, 6.4, and 12.8) and 2
conditions (Same and Different). Regarding to the second table which presents the parameters of the second model, there are two different starting points for the Same and Different conditions. As we expected from behavioral data, when drift rates and starting point both are dependent on the previous decision, they got bigger values in the Same condition in comparison to the Different condition. Table 2 . Fitted parameters of modified diffusion model in which starting point is dependent to the previous decision.
Since models are different in terms of the number of free parameters, using a metric which takes this number into account is needed for comparing the models. AIC is a criterion to compare the models in terms of the information they lost from the real data. This criterion is independent of the number of free parameters. Here we compare the AIC of fitted models and choose the best one to describe the mechanism of the observed effect. AIC can be calculated from the squared error of the models with below formulation.
A second order bias correction for AIC was derived by Sugiura, Hurvich and Tsai (Hurvich, 1989; Sugiura, 1978) and is important to use in practice, particularly when sample sizes are small:
Where n is the number of samples, K is the number of free parameters and SS is the sum of squared errors.
Here we have three predicted performance and reaction time corresponded to three different coherencies of even trials. We calculate the SS as below: 3.2,6.4,12.8) and Rtdatai are the probability of being correct and reaction time in coherency i correspondingly in psychophysics data, Pmodeli and Rtmodeli are predicted performance and reaction time of fitted model in coherency i. Since models have two predictions in different modalities, we weight the errors of each prediction by the inverse of the standard deviation of that modality in psychophysical data. The more variant the modality is, the less important its prediction error is.
AIC difference and AIC weight can determine the best model among a model set. As Burnham et al stated (Burnham, 2011) , AIC difference bigger than 3 can strongly suggest the model with smaller AIC as the best one. AIC weight, calculated as below, indicates the probability of being the best model among the whole set of candidate models.
Where w is weights, ∆ is the difference between the AIC of each model and the minimum AICc between models. Table 3 shows that AICc in model with dependent zero point is way less than the other model. This difference is around 8 which strongly suggest the first model as the better one [41] . AIC weight also
shows that the first model is much more probable than the second one to fit the data. (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Voss et al., 2013; Voss et al., 2004; Voss & Voss, 2007) it seems that bound crossing in previous decision provides information for the next decision. This information increases the probability of being correct while both decisions are same and it decreases this probability when they are different. We hypothesize that the state of decision variable which accumulate information to reach any of two alternative bounds (Gold & Shadlen, 2007) will not be reset after making the decision. As a result, we expect a model with a history dependent bias term to work better than an independent one (Bogacz et al., 2006; Ratcliff, 1978 Ratcliff, , 2002 Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 2002) which was confirmed by our model comparisons. In addition, significant β1 in equation 2 shows that previous decision strongly contributes in the prediction of performance in next decision (Eq. 2, β1=0.25±0.09, ).
On the other hand, the effect could not be due to the change in sensory sensitivity (Akaishi et al., 2014) because of a couple of evidence: firstly, a model with history-dependent drift rate cannot explain the observed behavior. Considering that drift rates represent the mean of evidence provided by the stimulus, this result rules out the effect of the previous stimulus. Secondly, β1 in equation 4 is close to zero which imply that the strength of the stimulus in the previous trial does not affect the probability of being correct in the current decision (Eq. 4, p=0.017 ). Thus we conclude that the effect is not due to the adaptation in sensory level.
Regression analysis, especially equation 2 and 4, arise evidence about the presence of a unique bound in different difficulty -and consequently response time-conditions. The effect just depends on the decision itself so it can be interpreted that the state of DV at the time of decision is constant or equally an absorption unique bound should be satisfied for commitment to a choice.
Furthermore, the existence of the same effect in wrong odd trials, not only is against the adaptation hypothesis but also support the idea that the decision no matter is wrong or correct and no matter the feedback is positive or negative, affect the probability of the being correct in next decisions.
Finally, we believe that our observations and the suggested mechanism are in line with the mechanism of the change of mind (Fleming, 2016; Murphy, Robertson, Harty, & O'Connell, 2015; Resulaj, Kiani, Wolpert, & Shadlen, 2009 ). Resulaj et al. showed that the processing of accumulation can be continued even after making a decision. Here we proposed that this continues processing can intermix shreds of evidence between trials and affect the probability of being correct in a stream of decisions. 
R E F E R E N C E S

